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Abstract
Regulatory Negotiation is a relatively new approach to improving the
rulemaking process. The initial steps of the regulatory negotiation
process, leading up to face-to-face negotiations, may be termed the Pre-
Negotiation Phase. The actions taken during this phase have not been
well articulated or studied. During Pre-Negotiation affected parties
and major issues are identified; a preliminary version of the
negotiation agenda is formed; obstacles to negotiation are identified
and removed; representation of interests is established; the actual
negotiations are structured; and conditions are assessed to see if
negotiation is appropriate.
This analysis examines the Pre-Negotiation Phase of an Environmental
Protection Agency rulemaking effort focused on a Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Standards (LLW) rule. Some of the obstacles to regulatory
negotiation that occured in the LLW rulemaking case include imbalances
in power and resources; the lack of support for the process from within
the agency; a lack of awareness of regulatory negotiation; and
uncertainties surrounding this alternative process.
Despite the special circumstances of this first attempt by EPA at
regulatory negotiation, conclusions can be developed regarding ways to
improve future regulatory negotiations: an outside active
facilitator/mediator can play an essential role throughout the Pre-
Negotiation Phase; early active conflict assessment is crucial; strong
Program Office support or top-level agency pressure are needed to
proceed with a particular rule; the potential benefits of regulatory
negotiation must outweigh the potential threats and there are many
mechanisms available to EPA to help acheive this; a draft of protocols
should be provided to potential parties early in the process and
protocols should be set before parties are required to commit to
negotiate; promotional and educational efforts may be used to decrease
anxieties about a new process.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Lawrence Susskind, Professor of Urban
Studies and Planning
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PREFACE
In *January 1983, EPA initiated a Regulatory Negotiation
Demonstration Project. The purpose of the project was to test the
usefulness of face-to-face negotiations as a supplement to the current
rulemaking process. I worked as part of a negotiating team documenting
this process from its inception. We were hired by EPA to document two
regulatory negotiation demonstrations and to analyze their usefulness to
EPA. Our first product was a Status Report documenting the premise
behind the Project and EPA's efforts to solicit and evaluate candidate
rules for use in the two demonstrations.
The attached document is a second Status Report documenting EPA's
efforts to initiate negotiations on their first rule: Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Standards (LLW). The effort ran six months before EPA
deemed the conditions surrounding LLW unsuitable for use in the
demonstration. This report documents and analyzes this first effort at
regulatory negotiation and makes suggestions for future efforts. Many
of these suggestions were incorporated into EPA's second regulatory
negotiation effort (focused on a rule for Nonconformance Penalties
regarding Air Quality Standards). The parties to this second rule met
initially to set protocols on April 6, 1984 and are scheduled to meet
again on June 16, 1984.
Three agencies are currently experimenting with this alternative
approach to rulemaking: the Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal
Aviation Administration, and the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration. The reason that regulatory negotiation is currently
being explored is that the regulatory efforts of EPA and other federal
agencies have received much criticism in recent years from industry,
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public and environmental interest groups, and from within the agencies
themselves. Industry claims that the uncertainty surrounding the
outcome of regulations caused by extended court battles hinders
investment. Public interest groups feel that opportunities to
participate in the rulemaking process are too limited. The agencies
realize that too much time and money is tied up in the promulgation of
rules and subsequent litigation. All the groups feel that the
scientific and policy questions surrounding the development of a
regulation are not appropriately addressed in court.
One approach to improving the regulatory process, Regulatory
Negotiation, offers a potential means of overcoming some of the
weaknesses of traditional rulemaking. Regulatory negotiation uses face-
to-face negotiation among all affected parties to develop consensus
rules. These draft rules are then promulgated by the appropriate agency
in the traditional fashion. This process responds in part, to
complaints about the limits on public participation in the drafting of
federal regulations. In regulatory negotiation, all interested parties
play an active role from the outset (rather than merely raising
objections at formal hearings or initiating lawsuits once rules have
been promulgated).
Advocates of negotiated rulemaking suggest that direct
participation by interested parties helps legitimize proposed rules and
enhances their prospects for successful implementation. Negotiations may
create an atmosphere conducive to cooperation. Parties may work
together to find solutions. Regulatory negotiation encourages greater
sharing of information than traditional rulemaking which fosters
adversarial relations among affected parties.
The likelihood of court challenges by those who participate in
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regulatory negotiation should be small if decisions are made by
consensus. Also, there may be greater compliance with negotiated
regulations if all the regulated groups are involved. Less time and
fewer resources should be needed to produce each rule if court battles
are avoided and information is shared (reducing duplication of effort).
EPA's efforts surrounding the LLW rule all took place before face-
to-face negotiations actually began. We call this early part of a
regulatory negotiation the Pre-Negotiation Phase. The subsequent phases
are Negotiation and Implementation. Pre-Negotiation includes all the
steps leading up to face-to-face negotiations including the
identification and assessment of the interests involved and the
structuring of the negotiation protocols.
Current theories and studies of regulatory negotiation do not
formally articulate or give adequate attention to the steps which take
place before face-to-face negotiations begin. In public disputes, this
Pre-Negotiation Phase may often require a greater amount of the time and
effort put into a regulatory negotiation. A facilitator or mediator can
play an important part in making this phase run more smoothly and
successfully.
Thus, the elements of Pre-Negotiation ought to receive greater
attention and study. There are many questions which need to be answered
such as: what roles should the facilitator/mediator play in Pre-
Negotiation; what are the major obstacles to generating commitments to
negotiate and how can they best be addressed; how can representation of
diverse public groups and unorganized interests be ensured; and what are
the conditions which make the use of regulatory negotiation
inappropriate. This document considers many of these questions as they
6
apply to the LLW case.
I would like to thank Larry Susskind, my advisor, who worked
closely with me throughout the entire thesis development and writing
process. Larry gave me both advice and encouragement and I truly
appreciate his special efforts. I also want to thank my husband Scott
who lent a sympathetic ear for my frustrations and celebrated my
accomplishments.
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I. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS SURROUNDING A CANDIDATE RULE: THE CASE OF LOW-
LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE STANDARDS
The Emergence of the Proposed Rule
In January of 1983, EPA began searching for candidate rules for its
first two Negotiated Rulemaking Demonstrations. EPA narrowed its
preliminary list of candidate rules from twenty-two to two while
continuing to solicit additional rules. The suggestion that the Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Standards (LLW) rule be considered came from
EPA's Office of Radiation Programs (ORP) in June, 1983. As first
proposed, the rule would have involved consideration of an exposure
limit or "de minimus" level, (below which exposure to radioactive wastes
would not be regulated). The scope of the rule was subsequently
expanded to cover all aspects of a Low-Level Radioactive Waste Standard
(and not just the de minimus issue).
The de minimus rule was reviewed along with a second list of ten
more candidates in June, 1983 by EPA Project Director, Chris Kirtz;
former Project Director, Ken Young; and the facilitators from ERM-
McGlennon Associates. The eight criteria they used to evaluate the
suitability of candidate rules were: the apparent level of support from
the relevant EPA Program Office; the appropriateness of the mandated
time schedule for certain rules; the number of parties likely to be
involved; the identifiability of the parties; the likelihood that key
parties would agree to participate; the technical complexity of the
rule; the manageability of the level of controversy surrounding the
issues involved; the attractiveness to top EPA officials.
Only the de minimus rule, the proposed regulation of the chemical
MBOCA, and NOx Averaging survived the review.
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Initial Contact With Potential Stakeholders
(July-September 1983)
Once the LLW rule passed the initial screening, ERM-McGlennon began
contacting the parties likely to be involved. In late June and July,
ERM-McGlennon identified fourteen of the most obvious potential
stakeholders. They were in touch with many of these parties by phone.
The parties and their general reactions were:
*Conference of State Radiation Control Directors
-Several different regional offices were contacted. They
were generally supportive and interested in the Negotiated
Rulemaking Project. They had already established committees
to examine issues relating to a de minimus level of
exposure.
*Atomic Industrial Forum
-They had worked on the de minimus concept before and were
very interested in the Project.
*Sierra Club
-The Buffalo, New York chapter was identified as the
national coordinator for Sierra's low-level radioactive
waste effort. Sierra was active on LLW issues and was
referred by other environmental groups as playing a
leadership role on this issue. Sierra initially expressed
a willingness to negotiate.
A very different perspective came from the Boston,
Massachusetts chapter which felt it would be impossible for
the Sierra Club to endorse a minimum standard given the
limited scientific data available. They suggested that
more research would be needed.
*League of Women Voters
-They had done some work on LLW issues. They were
interested in the negotiated rulemaking process and viewed
it as a natural extension of the League's interest in
public participation.
*Utility Nuclear Waste Management Group (UNWMG)
-They were interested and willing to consider the
negotiated rulemaking idea. They had done some studies of
their own on the de minimus issue.
*Health Physics Society
-They already had an ad hoc committee exploring the de
minimus issue and were receptive to the concept of
negotiated rulemaking.
Other potential parties, identified as possible stakeholders but thought
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not to be as directly involved in the de minimus issue included:
Society of Nuclear Medicine; Regional Compacts for LLW Land Disposal;
U.S. Department of Transportation; National Governor's Association;
National Conference of State Legislatures; and the Union of Concerned
Scientists. (These parties were contacted in August and September).
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Department of
Energy (DOE) were identified as crucial participants because of their
jurisdiction over low-level radioactive waste disposal issues. EPA
decided not to approach them, however, until the decision to select the
LLW rule as the candidate for the first demonstration was more definite.
Response to Proposed Rule Within EPA
Al Alm, Deputy Administrator of EPA, gave approval on August 10,
to focus primarily on the LLW rule for the first Negotiated Rulemaking
Project. McGlennon and Kirtz met with Richard Guimond, Director of
Office of Radiation Program's (ORP) Criteria and Standards Division
within EPA on August 16. ORP is the Program Office with jurisdiction
over LLW. One outcome of the meeting was a recognition that NRC support
is essential. Thus, EPA decided that NRC's willingness to participate
had to be confirmed before a decision could be made to move any further
on the LLW rule. Guimond and his ORP staff requested that an assessment
also be made of another potential rule, Uranium Mining Standards, before
going ahead with the deminimus rule.
Guimond and ERM-McGlennon met with NRC staff to discuss the LLW
candidate rule and their interest in negotiation. NRC thought that
regulatory negotiation was a good idea and offered preliminary support
for the choice of the de minimus rule. In addition, Kirtz and ORP staff
met with a representative of DOE's Office of Defense Waste and
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By-Product Management. The official involved agreed in principal with
the concept of regulatory negotiation and the rule choice, but would not
commit the agency.
Another important meeting within EPA was held on September 16
between Kirtz, ERM-McGlennon, and top ORP officials, including Glen
Sjoblom, Director of ORP (and the person who would be EPA's chief
negotiator for the LLW rule). Sjoblom suggested that the only feasible
approach would be to address the entire set of radiation protection
standards for low-level radioactive waste disposal. He felt that the de
minimus issue could not be addressed separately. As a result, the scope
of the LLW rule was expanded.
Conflict Assessment:Follow-up Contacts With Potential Participants
(October 19-2)1
On October 13, ERM-McGlennon sent out a letter to thirteen
1
stakeholders likely to be central to LLW rulemaking. The letter
announced that the entire LLW standard would be focus of the negotiated
rulemaking effort. The letter also asked the recipients to make a
commitment by November 8, 1983, to negotiate. The letter included a list
of the thirteen stakeholders and it requested suggestions for additional
parties who should be included. A date was set for a first meeting at
which procedural groundrules would be discussed. The letter contained a
brief draft of the types of groundrules to be covered.
On October 19-21, ERM-McGlennon conducted conflict assessment
interviews in Washington D.C. with eleven of the identified
stakeholders. Two other stakeholders were interviewed by phone. The
S
See appendix 1 for a sample letter.
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full list included: Department of Energy (DOE); Atomic Industrial
Forum; Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); House Sub-Committee on
Energy and Environment; League of Women Voters; Utility Nuclear Waste
Management Group/ Edison Electric Institute; The American College of
Radiology; The Environmental Policy Institute; National Conference of
State Legislatures; Office of Radiation Programming-EPA; The National
Governor's Association; Health Physics Society; and Sierra Club.
According to ERM-McGlennon, the purpose of the conflict assessment
interviews was to "identify the primary concerns of the parties and the
liklihood of their participation in the negotiations". Another purpose
was to "identify other affected and interested parties". ERM-McGlennon
also used the interviews to respond to questions about the negotiation
process.
Each party was asked to describe its organization; its familiarity
with low-level waste and formal negotiation procedures; the principal
concerns of its organization; other parties that should be included in
the process; and to discuss the likelihood of its participation in a
negotiation concerning the whole LLW standard or just the de minimus
2
issue.
Hesitant Groups
As a result of these conflict assessment interviews, ERM-McGlennon
identified several organizations with serious concerns and reservations.
Those groups with the most substantial concerns were: Environmental
organizations (the Environmental Policy Institute, the Sierra Club); the
House Sub-Committee on Energy and the Environment; the National
2
See Appendix 2 for the full conflict assessment format.
12
Governor's Association; and the Office of Radiation Programs in EPA.
Industrial groups were the most supportive.
ERM-McGlennon summarized these reservations under six headings:
Representation
1. Concern that one or two environmental groups would not be able to
represent the entire "environmental community".
2. Difficulty in checking back with constituencies, especially for
environmental groups and the National Governor's Association.
3. Concern over achieving balanced representation of all the parties in
the negotiations.
Timing
4. Fear of disrupting on-going state and compact efforts to site low-
level disposal facilities before the 1986 deadline (i.e. some people
might want to delay until the LLW rule could be finalized).
5. Concern that the issue is not ripe for resolution because of the lack
of conclusive scientific research and insufficient public awareness to
allow the constituents of environmental groups to participate
knowledgeably.
Resources
6. Lack of sufficient staff resources to attend negotiations and
participate effectively.
Jurisdiction
7. EPA's decision to develop this rule was questioned because some
groups considered the NRC regulations to be adequate; EPA's jurisdiction
in this area was challenged.
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Litigation
8. Promulgating a LLW standard may re-open the NRC 10 CFR Part 61
regulations (governing low-level waste sites and shallow land burial) to
further challenge and litigation; also the experimental nature of
regulatory negotiation may lead to litigation over the resulting rule.
Scope of Rule
9. Of the stakeholders who were willing to participate, many would do so
only if the de minimus issue rather than the whole LLW standard was the
focus.
Meeting With Environmental Groups
The two groups ERM-McGlennon identified as presenting the largest
stumbling blocks were EPA's ORP and the environmental groups. Without
these groups, there could not possibly be balanced representation of
all key interests. In late October, the ORP finally endorsed the LLW
rule selection and the regulatory negotiation idea.
Thus, ERM-McGlennon focused its attention of the environmental
groups. To further understand and address their concerns, EPA (both OPRM
and ORP) held a meeting on October 28 with five key environmental
organizations: Environmental Policy Institute, National Resource Defense
Council, Union of Concerned Scientists, Environmental Defense Fund, and
Sierra Club. The environmentalists questioned EPA's authority to
promulgate LLW standards. They also questioned the suitability of the
LLW rule for regulatory negotiation. They claimed that they did not have
adequate resources to participate effectively. They were also concerned
that an initial willingness to participate in negotiated rulemaking
could be construed as an endorsement of the process before it had ever
been tried.
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Dave Berrick of the Environmental Policy Institute (identified as a
key environmental party) put his concerns in writing:
1) LLW is not an appropriate rule choice; it does not fit EPA's
criteria.
2) LLW could have dozens of affected interests making the size of
parties unmanageable.
3) The technical data surrounding the affects of low-level
radiation are highly controversial and intensely debated.
4) Authority to promulgate the LLW rule did not come from any
specific legislative action, thus the parties and issues would
not be well defined.
5) Representation is very difficult in large public groups
because it is difficult to keep in contact with the constituency.
A "communication/consensus mechanism" and the resources to
maintain it are needed.
6) Environmentalist groups do not have adequate resources for
participation. The $50,000 Resource Pool falls short of what is
needed. Also too many public groups depend on "non-neutral" DOE
for funding involving LLW issues.
7) Parties should know and agree to groundrules and participation
rights before committing to negotiate or beginning "official"
negotiations.
8) The rule is too technical, environmental groups cannot get up
to date on the technical issues before the negotiations begin.
Also, negotiation is not suitable for scientific debate.3
The meeting concluded with an agreement to hold still another meeting
involving interested environmental groups and EPA to address these
concerns. This meeting was supposed to include a discussion of
procedural groundrules that the environmentalists could accept.
LLW Taken Out of Consideration
As a result of the October 28th meeting and subsequent phone
3
See appendix for the Environmental Policy Institute
letter.
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conversations with many of the environmental groups, ERM-McGlennon
concluded that the "active, supportive and balanced representation from
the environmental community" would be unlikely if the LLW rule were
chosen. ERM-McGlennon recommended that no further effort be made to
promote the LLW rule and that resources instead be used for "developing
a closer working relationship with the environmental community and
identifying alternative rules".
On November 10, Al Alm amd Jack Campbell(OPRM) met with Bill Butler
of the National Audobon Society, and Barbara Finnemore and David Doniger
of NRDC to discuss the LLW rule. After discussing the
environmentalists concerns, EPA stated that it intended to drop the LLW
rule. The three environmentalists agreed to go back to the
environmental community and solicit other possible rules that they would
recommend as good candidates for negotiation. EPA gave the
environmental groups two weeks to come up with the recommendations. In
addition, EPA indicated that it would solicit additional rules from its
Program Offices.
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II. CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE PRE-NEGOTIATION PHASE OF THE REGULATORY
NEGOTIATION PROJECT
Pre-Negotiation and Its Importance to Regulatory Negotiation
Public dispute resolution can be divided into three phases: Pre-
Negotiation, Negotiation, and Implementation. In general, the Pre-
Negotiation Phase involves assessing the problem and structuring the
face-to-face negotiations. This first phase is very often the dominant
and most difficult phase in public sector dispute resolution. One
reason, is that public sector, all-party negotiation is a relatively new
and infrequently used process. There are no well established procedures
or norms. Also, the affected parties are often numerous, unorganized,
and difficult to identify.
In the case of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste rule, a great deal
of time was spent in the Pre-Negotiation Phase. Starting in June 1983
(when the rule was proposed and initially evaluated as a good potential
rule), six months were spent in Pre-Negotiation. If the rule had not
been dropped at this point, this phase would have continued for a
minimum of two more months until the first official negotiation took
place. Given that the actual Negotiation Phase has a time limit of six
months set by EPA, the Pre-Negotiation Phase represents a significant
portion of the entire Regulatory Negotiation process.
It is important to note that some of the time spent in Pre-
Negotiation in this first Regulatory Negotiation Demonstration was a
function of the newness of the process. Thus, this case may well exceed
the norm. Nevertheless, it seems likely that a significant investment
of time and energy will be needed in future regulatory negotiations in
the Pre-Negotiation Phase.
The major objective of Pre-Negotiation is to identify and remove
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obstacles to negotiation. An assessment should also be made during this
phase of the prospects of removing the obstacles to face-to-face
negotiation. Harold Saunders describes several stages which must take
place before an international bilateral negotiation can take place. The
same is true for regulatory negotiation.
One stage is defining the problem. The parties involved must be
identified and they must share a common definition of the range of
issues to be negotiated. In the Negotiated Rulemaking Demonstration, EPA
seeks to define the general outline of the items to be negotiated
through its mandate to promulgate a regulation. However, the other
participants must agree within each group and among all groups on what
specific issues are to be addressed. The task of defining the scope of
negotiations in a regulatory negotiation is much broader and more
difficult than commenting on or litigating a proposed rule.
The second stage described by Saunders is producing the necessary
commitments to negotiate. All the parties must judge that a negotiated
solution would serve their interests better than a traditional
rulemaking process. Also, the parties must feel that the balance of
power (i.e. technical expertise, monetary resources, and negotiation
skills) is such that a fair settlement is possible.
A third necessary stage within Pre-Negotiation is to agree on the
structure of the negotiation and the procedures or protocols to be used.
This involves generating agreement on issues such as:
*basis for decision making (consensus, majority, etc.)
*meeting place and frequency
*use of technical data and other information
*relationship with the press
*information sharing
In summary, the steps which should be completed during the
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Pre-Negotiation Phase include:
* Identifying Affected Parties and Major Issues
This step is part of defining the problem. The parties and
issues must be identified in order to give focus to the
negotiation.
* Forming a Preliminary Version of the Agenda for Negotiation
This step is also a part of defining the problem. The issues
to be negotiated must be defined and agreed upon to set the scope
of the negotiations.
* Identifying and Removing Obstacles to Negotiation
This step is an essential part of producing commitments to
negotiate. There are always obstacles to be addressed such as
unequal resources and skills; lack of trust in the process and of
other parties; and concern over the effects of negotiation on
subsequent options to litigate.
* Ensuring Adequate Representation of Interests
This step is also important in producing commitments to
negotiate. It is sometimes difficult to find people who can
serve as representatives of group interests and are accepted as a
spokesperson by the group. Representatives must maintain contact
with constituents during negotiations. Teams may be needed if
there are too many interests or parties at the table. Also a
balance of interests acceptable to all, parties must be
established.
* Establishing Groundrules and Logistics
This step structures the actual negotiations in a way that
all parties agree to. The groundrules are often set in a
negotiation session involving all affected parties. Groundrules
may be the topic of the first "official" negotiation.
* Assessing if Conditions are Suitable for Proceeding with
Negotiation
This step is conducted continuously throughout Pre-
Negotiation as more information is learned. The Pre-Negotiation
process may be halted at any point if conditions are found to be
inappropriate for continued negotiation.
Extent and Style of Facilitator Involvement During Pre-Negotiation
A facilitator plays a very crucial role during the Pre-Negotiation
Phase of negotiated rulemaking. The conditions associated with public
disputes usually necessitate a more active role for a
facilitator/mediator than the role played by intermediaries in the
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traditional collective bargaining situations. The more traditional role
of a facilitator is typically limited to scheduling meetings, conveying
confidential messages back and forth, etc. In public sector disutes,
the facilitator/mediator may need to expand the traditional roles to
involve action in all of the six steps. Within these steps, the
facilitator may need to: identify unorganized but legitimate interests
that should be included in the negotiations; balance the interests
represented; address inequities in power and resources by helping the
pa.rties to improve their negotiation skills and improving access to
resources; suggest draft protocols for the conduct of negotiations;
take an active role in generating commitments to negotiate.
These types of actions are needed in regulatory negotiation for
several reasons. The facilitator/mediator must be more active because
it is hard to identify legitimate spokespeople for the large numbers of
interested parties. Also a framework and norms for public sector
negotiations are not codified or well-understood. There are great
differences in levels of expertise and access to information among the
parties. Parties lack experience with negotiation which can bog the
negotiations down. Finally, there are no past bargaining relations
4
which help to establish communications and build trust.
The roles which ERM-McGlennon played in the LLW rule Pre-
Negotiation Phase were extensive. In their May 1983 memo, they
anticipated being involved in: identifying and meeting with parties to
discuss their willingness to participate, conditions for participation,
and preferred protocols; and drafting proposed protocols.
4
Denise Maddigan and Lawrence Susskind, "Six Innovations in the
Process of Public Dispute Resolution" Justice System Journal,
(forthcoming).
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In the LLW effort, ERM-McGlennon was involved to varying degrees in
all six of the Pre-Negotiation steps. They were actively involved with
EPA in identifying affected parties and ensuring balanced
representation. They also played a significant role in meeting with
parties to identify concerns about the proposed process. Also they
conducted individual conflict assessments with key parties to determine
if face-to-face negotiations would be effective.
Criteria for Evaluating Rule Suitability
Prior to the Pre-Negotiation Phase of the demonstration, EPA had to
assess the suitability of LLW as a candidate rule. It asked the
facilitator to help make this assessment.
Why LLW was Initially Selected
LLW was the top candidate rule for at least five months. The
following factors made it an appealing rule to EPA and ERM-McGlennon:
1) Ground had been broken with dialogues on LLW and some
coalitions had already formed.
-The Conservation Foundation had sponsored an eighteen month
Dialogue Group on Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management in 1980-
81. The group included waste generators, state regulators,
citizens and environmental groups. The de-minimus issue for LLW
was discussed.
-Massachusetts Department of Health had completed an eighteen
month consensus building process on LLW disposal issues.
2) LLW standards were an important rule which could draw interest
in Regulatory Negotiation and appeal to top-level EPA officials.
3) The parties were identifiable and from initial contacts it
seemed likely that most would participate. The numbers seemed
manageable.
4) Technically there is no way to assert a cut-off point for
"safe" radiation exposure so it may be a negotiable rather than a
technical issue. Other issues were clearly negotiable.
5) The EPA Program Office suported the rule. There was
hesitation on the part of the Office of Radiation Programs until
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October, but in general there was support. Few other rules had
any Program Office support.
Objections to the Rule
The major objections to the LLW rule came from environmental
groups. They challenged the suitability of the rule for negotiation.
They especially questioned its suitability in light of EPA's announced
selection criteria:
1) Issues too controversial for negotiation
- People are highly emotional about these issues. Data to
resolve contradictory claims do not exist at this time.
2) Potentially too many parties
- LLW standards affect hundreds of potential parties from
industry, hospitals, research labs, and universities.
3) Too technically complex for public groups to keep up
-environmental groups are not up to date on the technical issues
and the negotiation process would move too quickly for them to
stay abreast of the issues.
4) Timing is not right
-not enough scientific evidence yet to set appropriate standards
-issues and positions not well defined; lack of statutory
background for defining issues.
Once it became evident to EPA and ERM-McGlennon that the
environmentalists might not be willing to participate, EPA began to
worry about the prospect of unbalanced participation.
Adequate Party Interest vs Controversial Nature of the Rule
EPA faced a dilemma in evaluating LLW as the rule for the first
Regulatory Negotiation. On one hand, a rule was needed with appeal to
top-level EPA officials so that the Project would recieve strong
administrative support to be carried out. (The Project had lost momentum
with the change in EPA heads from Burford to Ruckleshaus.) The rule
selected needed to be significant enough to catch the attention of top-
level EPA. Also, the rule needed enough interest from potential parties
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to garner interest in this new process and set a good precedent.
However, on the other hand, if the rule selected is too
controversial, top-level EPA will not support it because of potential
adverse press coverage and pressures from objecting groups. Also, the
demonstration would not be a good test if the rule was so controversial
that it was not a "typical" rule.
The LLW rule captured the attention of the parties and some
attention from top-level EPA officials. However, the highly
controversial and emotionally charged character of the LLW issues ended
up causing EPA drop the LLW rule. As Regulatory Negotiation is used
more often, the degree of controversy suitable for negotiation should
become more clear. The need to have a less controversial, more typical
rule should become less important as the process becomes better known
and accepted.
Selecting and Contacting Parties
Selection Process
ERM-McGlennon conducted most of the identification and interviewing
of potential parties. The initial efforts to identify affected parties
were drawn from the following sources: EPA's Regulatory Development
Plan for the LLW rule; suggestions from EPA's Office of Policy and
Resource Management; ERM-McGlennon's knowledge of groups involved with
LLW issues; previous attempts at consensus building and dialogues on
LLW. ERM-McGlennon identified sixteen potential participant groups
5
including key industry, environmental and civic groups. ERM-McGlennon
5
See pages 2 and 3 of Chapter I for names of identified parties.
23
contacted each group by phone. They asked for reactions to the proposed
rule and suggestions on additional potential parties.
In asssessing these groups as potential parties, ERM-McGlennon
tried to determine: 1) if the parties were affected by the proposed
rule; 2) if they had devoted past resources to these issues; and 3) if
the process caught their attention. The appropriate federal agencies
were not approached by EPA until after the initial assessments had been
made of other parties and positive interest was discovered.
ERM-McGlennon's initial contacts led to the identification of still
other potential parties who were also contacted by phone by ERM-
McGlennon. By the time the ERM-McGlennon held individual conflict
assessments in Washington D.C. (October 19-21), thirteen essential
stakeholders had been identified. ERM-McGlennon hoped to minimize
resistance to the process and the LLW rule by answering questions and
addressing concerns before the deadline for commitments to participate.
Representation
There are many problems involved in establishing who the legitimate
representatives of stakeholding interests are in public disputes. Even
when the appropriate spokespeople have been identified, there are often
no mechanisms in place to ensure that those present at the negotiating
table are in touch with their constituents. When there are inadequate
links between representatives and their constituents, groups not
directly involved in the negotiations may be more likely to challenge
the rule with litigation after it is promulgated by EPA.
EPA and ERM-McGlennon had difficulty in identifying the appropriate
groups to talk to within the environmental community concerning LLW
issues. The lack of a well-defined chain of command made it difficult
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to establish acceptable representation.
ERM-McGlennon initially identified the New York Chapter of the
Sierra Club and the Environmental Policy Institute as the key
environmental groups involved in LLW issues. However, other
environmental groups such as Natural Resource Defense Council and the
Audobon Society came forth later in the Pre-Negotiation Phase and played
active roles in identifying problems with LLW as a candidate rule. More
interaction with the environmental community and other public interest
groups may be necessary to identify adequate representatives of their
collective interests.
A second issue in representation is maintaining a "workable" number
of parties to the negotiation. The Federal Advisary Committee Act
(FACA), under which the demonstration must operate, limits the number of
6
participants in a regulatory negotiation to fifteen. One step taken to
reduce the number of potential parties was to involve national rather
than state or regional groups. EPA and ERM-McGlennon planned to use
national organizations such as the National Governor's Association and
National Conference of State Legislatures rather than state and regional
organizations. Also, they hoped to use national industry organizations
like the Atomic Industrial Forum to represent waste generators and
facility operators.
The formation of teams to represent groups of interests was another
mechanism open to EPA and ERM-McGlennon. They chose not to use it.
Effective team representation requires that clusters of interest groups
6
The Federal Advisary Committee Act (FACA) sets certain limits on
any advisary group to an agency. Under current laws, a regulatory
negotiation group will be set up as an Advisary Committee. Thus it must
operate under these FACA requirements.
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choose a spokesperson who does the actual negotiating but all on the
team guide the strategy and sign agreements. EPA chose not to form
teams with the LLW parties mainly because it felt that the total number
of participants could be kept to a minimum while still ensuring the
negotiation's success.
A third issue is achieving a balance of the represented interests
so that no group feels threatened by the negotiation process. Although
regulatory negotiation uses consensus as the basis for making
decisions, a set of interests which feels outnumbered at the table can
be at a disadvantage in the negotiations. This group may succomb more
easily to social pressures from the rest of the negotiating groups. The
Pre-Negotiation Phase for the LLW rule did not get far enough along for
the final balance of power among the participants to become clear. In
general, EPA wanted a balance of representatives from waste generators,
civic and environmental groups, and state and federal government. Some
environmental groups expressed a concern that they would be outnumbered
at the table and they wanted to know the balance before agreeing to
negotiate.
In the end, the balance of interests was a factor in EPA's
decision to drop the LLW rule. Once it became very likely that there
would not be sufficient and supportive participation from the
environmental community on the LLW rule, balanced negotiations seemed
unfeasable.
Early Identification of Party Concerns
A major question surrounding the LLW rule is why it took five
months to discover significant concerns of some groups which would make
the LLW rule unsuitable for negotiation. When two key environmental
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groups were initially contacted by ERM-McGlennon, they were giving first
impressions on an unfamiliar process. It took time for environmental
groups to communicate among themselves and to analyze the suitability of
the rule for this new process. The objections to the rule took time to
emerge.
A second reason is that EPA and ERM-McGlennon may not have gone far
enough in seeking other environmental groups to participate. More
exploration of the attitudes and concerns of the environmental community
early in the process, might have brought out the problems sooner in the
Pre-Negotiation Phase. The likelihood of addressing these concerns could
then have been determined before other parties had devoted substantial
time and resources to preparation for the negotiation process.
An important outcome of the LLW rule assessment and continued
exploration of the feasability of other rules is that many more parties
are now aware of the regulatory negotiation process. Also, regulatory
negotiation has received attention from within the environmental
community from NRDC which helped to legitimize the process by soliciting
possible candidate rules once LLW was dropped. In addition, ERM-
McGlennon now believes that party identification and assessment
strategies must go beyond the parties initially claiming to be involved
so that concerns of all affected groups are likely to be identified
earlier in the Pre-Negotiation Phase.
Getting the Parties to the Table
The Balance of Power and Resources
Imbalances in power and resources are a major obstacle to securing
commitments to participate in regulatory negotiation. Large imbalances
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inhibit negotiation. More powerful groups may presume that bargaining
or compromise is not necessary to achieve their goals. Power and
resource imbalances can also create psychological barriers to
negotiation. Parties which perceive themselves to be in a weaker
7
relative position may feel intimidated in a negotiation setting.
The primary power and resource imbalances found in the proposed LLW
rule negotiation were time, access to technical data and information,
and negotiation skills. There is a fairly large investment of time
required to prepare for and participate in negotiations. For government
and industry, there may be employees who can participate within the
context of their job. There are greater constraints on the amount of
time representatives of non-profit organizations and voluntary
associations can devote to the process.
Lack of access to technical data and information is also imbalanced
against the non-profit organizations. Industry is the party being
regulated, so it usually has the most information pertaining to
production processes and the probable nature of regulatory impacts.
Government agencies have large budgets for aquiring and analyzing
information although they still depend on industry for much of their
data. Non-profit organizations are in a relatively weak position
because they usually lack the clout to demand that information be shared
or the expertise to evaluate the information. This relative imbalance
is likely to produce a refusal to negotiate. The alternative route of
litigating rules may be more appealing. The legal process forces
7
Timothy Sullivan, "Resolving Development Disputes Through
Negotiation, Graduate School of Public Policy, University of
California at Berkeley, September 1983.
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information into the open. Also, non-profit groups presently have an
easier time raising contributions to support legal action.
There is also often a lack of negotiation skills in public disputes
and an imbalance of the skills which exist. Conflicts are resolved more
effectively when the negotiators have skills which allow them to
8
articulate their interests and understand bargaining signals.
Negotiations can become bogged down when the parties are unfamiliar with
negotiation techniques.
Removing Obstacles to Negotiation
A party's decision about whether or not to come to the negotiation
table is based on an evaluation of the likely consequences of this
action. The major concerns mentioned by potential LLW parties not
directly addressing the LLW rule choice, focused on the factors of power
and resources. For the parties with relatively less power and
resources, the potential threats of regulatory negotiation may appear to
outweigh the benefits. The potential threats and benefits to
negotiating parties are as follows:
potential threats
1) lack of money and time to participate effectively and keep up
with the fast pace of the negotiation process
2) lack of technical data and expertise
3) lack of skill in negotiation
4) fear of direct confrontation with more powerful groups
5) fear of too many parties "on the other side" (unbalanced
representation).
8
Timothy Sullivan.
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potential benefits
1)likely to have more influence on a rule in a consensual process
2) addresses all substantive issues rather than just those
procedural issues permitted by the court
3) cuts the uncertainty and long delays presently caused by
litigation
4) may reduce the effort and cost involved tn trying to influence
the substantance of a rule.
Resource Pool
ERM-McGlennon and EPA tried to counter the "threats" associated
with negotiation in order to get the LLW stakeholders to come to the
table. One incentive they could point to was the Resource Pool. Fifty
thousand dollars (half from EPA and half from foundations) was promised
for use by all the stakeholders. The stipulations were that the entire
negotiating group must agree on how the money would be used (i.e. for
technical analysis, joint studies, legal advice, etc.). The
availability of the Resource Pool, it was suggested, could help to
decrease any imbalances in access to information.
A problem with the consensus method of distributing the money is
that the less powerful groups have no reason to believe that the more
powerful groups would allocate them enough money to participate
effectively. One way of addressing this concern might have been for EPA
to guarantee that groups with few resources would receive enough money
to cover their transportation and out-of-pocket expenses. The whole
negotiation group could still allocate the remainder of the money as it
chooses.
Negotiation Workshops
Regulatory Negotiation is a relatively new concept. Only two other
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agencies (Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Federal
Aviation Administration) are currently testing its usefulness. As
mentioned previously, many potential stakeholders had little or no
negotiation experience. For some who were unfamiliar with the process,
it was intimidating. A good way to dispell such fears and to help the
parties participate more effectively would be for EPA to offer workshops
on negotiating skills.
ERM-McGlennon had hoped to hold such a workshop in December of 1983
to help prepare interested parties for negotiation. The availability of
such workshops is an important incentive to get parties to commit to
participate.
Technical Briefings
In addition to being unfamiliar with negotiation techniques, many
of the parties were not up to date on LLW issues. Negotiations run more
rapidly and smoothly if the parties start with the same base of
background knowledge concerning a rule. ERM-McGlennon or even EPA could
have offered to review recent studies or to provide a panel of experts
to answer questions. EPA and ERM-McGlennon considered holding
technical briefings, but none were held before the rule was dropped in
November.
For future regulatory negotiation efforts it might be desirable for
the initiating agency to form a Technical Advisary Committee before
face-to-face negotiations begin. This committee could be comprised of
technical experts approved by all participants. Such a committee could
be responsible for briefing all groups to bring them up to date on
available scientific evidence pertaining to the rule. The committee
could also serve in an advisary capacity throughout the negotiations.
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Balancing Interests
Relatively weaker parties often fear direct confrontation with more
powerful groups. Such concerns are intensified if less powerful parties
feel outnumbered as well. These concerns can be at least partially
addressed by guaranteeing that balanced representation is a prerequisite
for proceeding with negotiations.
In the case of the LLW rule, ERM-McGlennon suggested that EPA
address the environmentalists concerns that they would be outnumbered by
reserving a certain number of seats at the bargaining table for the
environmental community. The value of this suggestion was not fully
tested in the case of the LLW rule since the Pre-Negotiation Phase was
cut short.
Establishing Protocols Prior to Negotiation
The issue of establishing the protocols for negotiation is circular
in that some parties refuse to come to the table until the procedural
groundrules are set, but the ground rules cannot be set until all
parties agree to them. Thus, the only practical way to establish
protocols is to have all the parties at the table to work them out
together.
The environmental groups commenting on the proposed LLW rule wanted
protocols to be established before they endorsed the regulatory
negotiation process by coming to the table. ERM-McGlennon could not
negotiate the ground rules with one group without consulting all other
parties as well.
Prior to dropping the LLW rule, EPA tentatively scheduled a meeting
in January 1984 of all the parties to discuss negotiation protocols.
Thus, they were asking for commitments to participate before the
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protocols were discussed. Perhaps for future negotiations, EPA might
want to have all the parties commit to draft protocols before asking for
commitments to participate in the process. Prior to this meeting EPA
could ask for a commitment to participate in the protocol meeting with
agreement to continue if the meeting is successful. This approach may
help address the environmentalists' concern that they did not want to
endorse the process by coming to the table before they knew how the
process would be conducted.
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III.OBSTACLES TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REGULATORY NEGOTIATION
Problems in Implementing Regulatory Negotiation
There is risk and uncertainty associated with any new way of doing
things. Because the process is relatively new and untested in the
rulemaking context, the outcomes are uncertain. The lack of familiarity
with the negotiation process and skills may make it seem like a very
risky undertaking for potential participants. Also, large bureaucracies
9
prefer to maintain the status quo rather than take risks.
A consensual negotiation process may also threaten agency
rulemaking officials. They may fear the loss of their authority and
jurisdiction in the area of promulgating rules. In the consensual
process, they become just one of many decision makers, each with veto
power.
Of course, a similar "threat" to jurisdiction already exists in the
form of legal challenges to agency rulemaking decisions. Agency
officals lose control over the final outcome of a rule when it is taken
to court. Bringing affected interests in at the beginning of the
process may reduce these challenges to the final rule and allow the
10
agency final say in the outcome of the rule. Nevertheless, a
perceived threat to rulemaking jurisdiction may cause agency rulemaking
officials to shy away from participating in regulatory negotiation.
9
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Finally, parties must feel that the regular rulemaking process is
not constrained in instances where regulatory negotiation does not
produce consensus on a rule. It is still not clear, for example, how
participation or a refusal to participate in regulatory negotiation
affects a party's ability to subsequently litigate a proposed rule.
Limits on the use of information obtained during a regulatory
negotiation in subsequent litigation are not yet established.
Given these obstacles, there are several things EPA can do to
improve the likelihood of successful implementation of a regulatory
negotiation effort: increase agency support and promotional efforts;
increase public understanding of the process; decrease the degree of
uncertainty surrounding certain aspects of the process and the roles of
key parties.
Agency Support
Regulatory negotiation cannot survive at EPA without strong
advocates within the agency. Inertia and opposition to change in any
bureaucracy are difficult to overcome. The regulatory negotiation
process has to be sold within the agency as well as to outside parties.
During the Pre-Negotiation Phase of the LLW Standards, ground was broken
by the Project Director and the Facilitator in gaining support from the
different sectors within EPA. However, the delay in obtaining the
backing of the Administrator and Program Office heads contributed to the
problems in bringing the LLW rule to negotiation.
Top-Level Officials
The Regulatory Negotiation Project must have the endorsement and
active support of top-level officials for successful implementation.
Top-level promotion is also important to overcome inertia and solicit
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cooperation from the Program Offices within EPA who will actually do the
negotiating.
During the Pre-Negotiation Phase of the LLW rule, the top EPA
officials endorsed the Project but did not actively promote and support
.it. Al Alm, EPA Deputy Administrator, indicated support for the Project
on August 2, 1983 and expressed a preference for LLW Standards as the
first rule. However, little effort was made by Alm or Ruckleshaus to
legitimize the project, by talking or writing to groups to show support
and address their anxieties, until very late in the process. They did
not put pressure on hesitant Program Offices.
Alm did meet with environmental groups once very strong objections
to the rule and the process had been raised with EPA's Policy Office.
However, this meeting came so late in the process that the focus was on
the particular rule and not the negotiation process per se. The need
was for top-level EPA support for the process not for a particular rule.
One reason why it may have been difficult for Ruckleshaus and Alm
to be more visible in their endorsement of regulatory negotiation was
11
the myriad of issues facing EPA at the time. They might not have
wanted to use up scarce bargaining chips to pressure environmental or
other groups for support of this project.
11
Top EPA officials were facing the aftermath of accusations and
investigations of EPA officials for illegal "under-the-table"
negotiations with private industry. The level of public trust in EPA had
greatly decreased. Public endorsement of the Project by a trusted
official such as Ruckleshaus, could have helped to legitimize the
project and distinguish this Regulatory Negotiation Project from the
covert private negotiations with industry. However, many other
projects needed top-level endorsement at the same time.
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Also, while EPA officials have the authority to demand support from
all Program Offices, they must wield that power sparingly. Other items
on the EPA agenda may have taken priority over winning Program Office
support for the regulatory negotiation project.
Program Offices
Each regulation promulgated by EPA falls under the jurisdiction of
a Program Office. Under the terms of the Regulatory Negotiation
Demonstration, the Director of the relevant Program Office will serve as
EPA's chief negotiator. Therefore, a negotiation cannot take place
without the approval and active participation of the respective Program
Office. In the early phases of evaluating the candidate rules, there
was little Program Office support for the Regulatory Negotiation
Project. The degree of Program Office support became an essential
criteria in evaluating the suitability of a proposed rule. Only two
Program Offices submitted candidate rules although suggestions were
requested several times. Some of this reluctance may be explained by the
previously mentioned concerns about risk and uncertainty associated with
a new and unfamiliar process. Also, the threat of losing some control
over rulemaking may have caused some Program Offices to try to avoid
having a rule under their jurisdiction selected for negotiation.
The Office of Radiation Programs (ORP), which had jurisdiction over
the LLW standards, suggested several potential candidate rules and was
receptive to the concept of negotiation. However, the office gave mixed
signals in its support for the LLW rule once it had passed the initial
screening. This hesitation seems to have been associated with their
uncertainty over the degree of control that ORP could maintain over the
rulemaking process.
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ERM-McGlennon's October conflict assessment pointed out that ORP
had "serious reservations" about becoming involved in regulatory
negotiation. Glen Sjoblom, Director of ORP, was hesitant to comit his
office unless he felt that he could "remain in control". He felt that
EPA's Policy Office (OPRM) had taken the lead with the LLW rule and it
was not maintaining adequately close contact with ORP.
It remains to be seen whether the perceived threat to Program
Office jurisdiction is too great to encourage acceptance of negotiated
rulemaking.
Project Director
A third actor within EPA with the power to substantially affect the
Project's success is the Project Director and other key members of the
Regulation Management Staff. Project Director, Chris Kirtz, worked hard
to promote the process within EPA and coordinate the mechanics of the
negotiation. Kirtz feels that he could have been more effective if he
had delved much farther into identifying affected parties and their
substantive concerns early in the process.
In my view, Kirtz also waited too long to formulate a strategy for
obtaining the necessary top-level EPA support of the process.
Shaping an Understanding of the Process
Another critical factor affecting successful implementation of
Regulatory Negotiation is making the process and its benefits known to
potential parties. Parties may not participate in this process over
traditional options if they do not fully understand its potential.
According to John McGlennon, a major impediment to dealing with the
hesitations of the environmental groups toward the proposed LLW rule was
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their unfamiliarity with the negotiation process.
Detailed Draft of the Process
If the negotiation process is too unfamiliar or open-ended some
groups will be scared away from participating. During the Pre-
Negotiation Phase of the LLW rule, ERM-McGlennon sent a brief draft of
12
potential groundrules to the likely parties. ERM-McGlennon suggested
that the groundrules, which set the procedures for the negotiations,
would be agreed upon at the first full negotiating session. The draft
protocols were too vague to give a sense of what to expect from the
process.
A more specific set of groundrules might have given parties who are
unfamiliar with the process a feel for what to expect. This description
should be offered as a draft from which parties can develop specific
procedures to fit individual needs and circumstances. Such a
detailed description gives structure and thus greater predictability to
the unfamiliar negotiation process. However, if detailed protocols are
circulated as a rough draft, some parties may feel trapped into a
process over which they had no control.
Gaining Public Acceptance
Public acceptance of regulatory negotiation should increase if the
process proves to be beneficial. However, before that time, the merits
of regulatory negotiation must be made known to develop an interest in
this process over the traditional process.
One step taken by ERM-McGlennon to build public support for
regulatory negotiation was to hold briefing meetings in May 1983
12
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in Washington D.C. Separate meetings were held with industry
representatives, environmental groups, and experienced environmental
mediators. ERM-McGlennon described plans for the Regulatory Negotiation
Demonstration Project and fielded questions and concerns. The meeting
served to heighten awareness of the process. Another step towards
gaining public acceptance was the development of a Regulatory
Negotiation "kit" by Project Director Kirtz. This information package
13
described the EPA project in some detail. Unfortunately, the kit was
not put together until November 1983, so it had no affect on the LLW
rule decision.
Media coverage is an important mechanism for making the
process better known and understood. Since its official inception in
January of 1983, the Project has received relatively little press
coverage even in technical and professional journals.
Decreasing Uncertainty
Some of the negative reactions observed in conflict assessments of
the LLW Standards were due to the many unknowns and uncertainties
surrounding regulatory negotiation. Parties are concerned with setting
favorable precedents for their roles in future negotiations. There are
three major issues and roles which are not yet established in the EPA
Regulatory Negotiation context: access to and use of information;
effects of negotiation on litigation; and power relationships. To the
extent that uncertainty around these factors is reduced, parties are
more likely to be willing to participate in negotiations.
13
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Access To and Use Of Information
Information is an important source of negotiating strength. How
information is obtained, shared, and used are important factors which
affect the outcome of negotiations and the relative influence of the
14
parties. The current EPA rulemaking process fosters adversarial
relationships among parties. Also there is little individual control
over how submitted information will be used. Thus, information is
withheld for fear that it would be misused or would compromise a group's
15
position.
In negotiations, parties may work together to find solutions and
are likely to have more influence on how data will be used to shape the
regulation. Thus, parties are more likely to share information. Joint
fact-finding processes in negotiations give a common base of information
which has credibility because all parties agree to the methods of
collection and evaluation. The Technical Advisary Committee mentioned in
Chapter II could be the medium for some of these data collecting
processes. Information sharing and joint fact-finding help to reduce
the large inequities in access to information among negotiating parties
in public disputes.
However, there are still some uncertainties surrounding the use of
information in negotiations which may inhibit information sharing if
they are not addressed. One uncertainty involves the allowable uses of
information. At present there is uncertainty concerning whether
positions and data disclosed in negotiation could be held against
14
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parties in subsequent rulemaking efforts if negotiation is unsuccessful
in producing concensus. Some example protections which could be
suggested as protocols to limit how information may be used are:
*establish that any particular position is tied to other aspects
of the standard, thus a party is not held to positions on
isolated issues;
*submit data in aggregate form;
*circulate initial positions without tying them to particular
parties- (mediator could make the suggestions);
*do not quote or refer to data, discussions, or positions in any
subsequent rulemaking process unless explicitly agreed on by all
parties to the negotiation.16
Another uncertainty involves the use of confidential business
information. At present, industries are required to reveal certain
information to EPA concerning the processes and materials they use.
However, industries may have some information which they do not want to
share with other competing industries also involved in a regulatory
negotiation. This issue must be addressed according to individual
circumstances around a particular regulation. It may be a factor which
makes certain regulations unsuitable for negotiation.
Effects of Negotiation on Litigation
Some groups may not be willing to participate in regulatory
negotiation unless they can be assured that traditional channels to
resolving regulatory disputes will remain open. On the other hand,
negotiation must reduce the likelihood of litigation or the negotiation
process becomes futile.
Every party must have an option not to participate in a proposed
16
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OSHA's Benzene Standard, August 1983.
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regulatory negotiation. However, it is very expensive to litigate and a
party would likely have to justify to a court why s/he did not
participate. The outcome of litigation is an unpredictable win or lose
situation. A party could have more influence and at least get some
interests met in a negotiation. Parties are likely to take the
negotiation option (if the obstacles to negotiation discussed in this
17
paper are removed).
Nevertheless, some litigation will still take place after
unsuccessful negotiations and even some "succesful" negotiations.
Parties fearing litigation will be more likely to withhold information
and refuse to cooperate if they fear having their positions later used
against them. The limits on the use of information in subsequent
litigation mentioned in the previous section are important to foster a
cooperative setting for sharing information. No precedent has been set
for litigation on a negotiated regulation.
Establishing Power Relationships
The way information is used, resources allocated, and skills
balanced will have a great effect on the power relationships that
develop in a regulatory negotiation process. Parties feeling at a great
disadvantage will not participate. In the case of the proposed LLW
rule, the objecting groups had concerns over both the rule itself and
potential imbalances of power.
Some groups may not be willing to negotiate unless they have
adequate access to resources, information, and negotiation training.
Without these critical ingredients, they may prefer litigation, even
17
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with its costs and risks. The availability of such things as the
Resource Pool and Information and Negotiation Workshops may help to
establish perceptions of more equal power relationships among the
parties.
The strong stances taken by environmental groups and by ORP were in
part an effort to establish favorable roles for their groups in
negotiations. Glen Sjoblom's request for five additional ORP staff for
the regulatory negotiation on LLW standards strengthens his Program
Office and sets a favorable precedent for future negotiations. The
environmental groups' long list of concerns and demands were in part an
attempt to establish the most favorable precedent for their role in this
new process.
In EPA regulatory negotiations, many of the same groups will meet
many times for different regulations. Groups often become more
cooperative when they have to work together over time. These conditions
can encourage the sharing of information and resources which would help
to equalize power among groups. However, if relatively stronger groups
feel they are giving up too much power, they may prefer to resort back
to litigation as the mode of settling disputes over regulations.
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IV.CONCLUSIONS
Did EPA Make The Correct Decision?
Yes, EPA's decision to drop the LLW rule from negotiation was
correct. The demonstration would have lacked legitimacy and received bad
publicity without the participation of the key environmental interest
groups. Also the hesitancy of the Program Office would have made it
difficult for the negotiation to succeed. Either EPA's top leadership
must be willing to press Program Offices to cooperate or regulatory
negotiation should only take place when actively supported by the
relevant Program Office.
Did the Facilitator/Mediator Make The Correct Decisions?
Yes, ERM-McGlennon performed well in just about all aspects of the
process. They were appropriately active in the Pre-Negotiation stage,
taking initiative and responsibility for the direction of the process.
ERM-McGlennon may not have done enough to identify the substantive
concerns of all the parties early in the process. Moreover, they did not
have an explicit strategy for defining whether environmental group
representation was adequate. They might have convened an assembly of
environmental groups to help determine a basis for acceptable
representation and to shape a clearer agenda of substantive concerns.
Lessons to Draw From the LLW Rule Experience
1. An outside active facilitator/mediator can play an essential role
throughout the Pre-Negotiation Phase of a regulatory negotiation
process. A facilitator/mediator needs to be active in this phase
because many of the affected interests for a rule are not easily
identified, representation of interests is unclear, and there are great
differences in levels of expertise and access to information among
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parties. The facilitator/mediator can address the potential obstacles
to achieving committments to negotiate. In order to avoid problems of
credibility and trust, the facilitator/mediator should come from outside
of EPA (which is an interested party to the negotiation).
2. Early active conflict assessment is crucial. The experience with the
LLW rule suggests that concerns of many key parties are not readily
apparent. Concerted efforts must be made by EPA and the facilitator to
seek out potentially affected parties and identify their concerns. It
is important to try to surface concerns early in the Pre-Negotiation
Phase to avoid having substantial investments made in a particular rule
only to have it fall through at the last minute.
3. Strong Program Office support or top-level agency pressure and
endorsement are needed to proceed. Regulatory negotiation cannot take
place without the approval and active participation of the relevant
Program Office (which is the primary negotiator for EPA). Inertia and
opposition to change may cause barriers to successful implementation of
regulatory negotiation. Either the Program Office must fully support a
particular rule or top-level officials must be willing to require
Program Office support. Public top-level endorsement is also important
to legitimize and emphasize the importance of a regulatory negotiation
effort for outside groups.
4. In order to bring the parties to the negotiating table, the potential
benefits of regulatory negotiation must outweigh the potential losses
Steps taken to address obstacles to negotiation can improve the
likelihood of participation. The Resource Pool is a crucial device for
addressing the concerns of potential participants over imbalances of
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power and resources (like the concerns mentioned by potential parties to
LLW). Other mechanisms such as technical briefings, Technical Advisary
Committees, and joint fact-finding efforts can serve to bring parties up
to date on technical aspects of the rule, form a common pool of data
from which parties can make decisions, and reduce the large inequities
in access to information among the negotiating parties. Negotiation
skill workshops may help parties who are unfamiliar with the negotiation
process to participate more effectively.
5. A draft of procedural protocols should be provided to potential
participants to increase their understanding of the regulatory
negotiation process and to give hesitant parties an idea of what to
expect. From this draft, parties can develop unique procedures to fit
the particular circumstances and needs. A major impediment to getting
some parties to participate in the LLW regulatory negotiation was their
lack of familiarity with the negotiation process. Meetings of all
potential parties should be held to set protocols prior to requiring
official committments to negotiate. This can avoid the dilemma of
parties being asked to commit to a process (and thus legitimizing it),
before the procedures have been determined. Once regulatory negotiation
has been tried, the protocols from past efforts could be presented to
potential parties as sample procedures used in negotiation.
6. Promotional and educational efforts to improve understanding of the
Regulatory Negotiation Demonstration should decrease anxieties about a
new process. Press coverage, briefing meetings, and information packets
can be used to increase public awareness and explain certain aspects of
the process. An interest in regulatory negotiation should be developed
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in its early stages of use to attract potential parties.
7. If these efforts at making the regulatory negotiation process
attractive to potential parties do not garner sufficient commitments to
negotiate, it may be necessary to make the alternative option of
litigation less attractive. Parties may not participate in regulatory
negotiation if they anticipate an expensive court battle afterwards.
Disincentives to litigation could make regulatory negotiation a more
competitive option. One method would be to require parties who refuse
to participate in regulatory negotiation to justify their reasoning to a
judge before being allowed to litigate a negotiated rule.
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ERM-McGlennon Fissociates
148 state s,*,et BosonMsahs
r-L October 11, 1983
Lisa Finaldi
Co-Director
Sierra Club
Radioactive Waste Campaign
78 Elmwood Ave
Buffalo, NY 14210
Dear Ms. Finaldi:
The purpose of this letter is to follow-up on your telephone
conversation with Peter Schneider regarding EPA's Negotiated
Rulemaking Project. As you know, this project will explore the
usefulness of all-party, face-to-face negotiations as a possible
supplement to the current rulemaking system. The negotiations
are intended to lead to a consensus which will be used as the
basis of- a proposed rule.
After carefully assessing over 30 candidate rules for
negotiated rulemaking, EPA has selected a rule to establish
radiation protection standards for low-level radioactive waste
disposal. The scope of the rule includes a determination of
whether or not there is a limit of exposure from the disposal of
radioactive waste below which radiation-related regulation is not
warranted. The scope of this proposed rule is outlined in
Attachment A of this letter.
The Negotiated Rulemaking Project and the selection of the
low-level waste rule have the full endorsement and support of
EPA. Glen L. Sjoblom, Director of the Office of Radiation
Program, (ORP) will be EPA's chief negotiator. Richard Guimond,
Director of ORP's Criteria and Standard Division will serve as
EPA's alternate.The Office of Policy and Resource Management will
provide logistic, administrative and management support.
This negotiated rulemaking effort, however, can only proceed
and be successful if all the key parties are willing to
participate in good faith. In earlier discussions with my
office, you expressed an interest in this project. Now that a
rule has been selected we are requesting a more formal commitment
from potential parties. I would appreciate it if you would
discuss your participation with your Board of Directors or
appropriate policy group. If you are willing to participate,
you will need to designate a senior person who can represent your
organization in the negotiations. We would like to obtain a
formal committment from all parties by November 8th.
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ERM-McGiennon Associates
As part of our conflict. assessment, we have identified and
contacted other parties who are likely to have an interest in
these negotiations (see Attachment C). Every effort will be made
to ensure that each interest is adequately represented on the
negotiating group. We would welcome your recommendation on other
parties that might be included. A Federal Register announcement
that is expected in the next few weeks will help to identify
parties we may have missed.
The negotiating body will operate as an advisory commitee
under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). FACA requires
that all formal negotiating'sessions be noticed in the Federal
Register. As such, the forthcoming Federal Register notice
mentioned above will announce the selection of the low-level
waste rule and set the date for the first meeting or negotiating
session. At this time, we expect the first negotiating session
to focus exclusively on procedural groundrules. It is
tentatively scheduled for January 16, 1984 in Washington, D.C.
The negotiations must be completed within six months.
I am pleased to report that progress has been made on the
the so-called Resource Pool which will support the negotiations
by funding activities such as training, computer simulation and
technical support. EPA has pledged $25,000 for this first rule
and an additional $25,000 is expected from private foundations.
The parties involved in the negotiations will develop their own
rules for requesting and approving funds. The American
Arbitration Association has agreed to serve as the clearinghouse
with respect to managing the pool.
The parties involved in the negotiations will also have to
agree upon a variety of groundrules at the first meeting. These
groundrules will include items such as how often to meet, where
meetings will be held or how to handle confidential information.
A draft of the procedural groundrules is included as Attachment
B.
In conclusion, I am delighted that the Negotiated Rulemaking
Project is moving-ahead and find the low-level waste rule
particularly exciting. I will be serving as the convenor/
facilitator working with all the parties to keep the process
running smoothly. The participation of the Sierra Club is
important to the success of this innovative project and I
encourage you to give it serious consideration. Finally, we will
be calling you next week to answer any questions you might have
and arrange a meeting if necessa y.
Sin ere/y,
n . kc ennorr
nvenor/Failitator
Encl. 51
ATTACHMENT A
SCOPE OF NEGOTIATION
RADIATION PROTECTION STANDARD
FOR LOW LEVEL WASTE DISPOSAL
The purpose of the negotiation is to develop environmental
radiation protection standards for low-level radioactive waste
disposal to protect the public health and general environment.
This will include consideration of a limit of exposure below
which radiation-related regulation is not warranted. This is
sometimes known as a level "below regulatory concern" (BRC) or a
"de-minimus " standard.
By definition, low-level radioactive wastes include all
radioactive wastes except high-level radioactive wastes, uranium
mill tailings, and wastes regulated under the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act of 1976. About 50% of commercial low-level
wastes are generated by facilities related to the production of
nuclear power; the rest come from medical and research institu-
tions and industrial facilities. Approximately an equal volume
of LLW is generated and disposed of by the Department of Energy
at their facilities. Typical wastes may include filter sludges,
dry compressible trash, protective clothing, animal carcasses,
and contaminated chemicals. They occur in a wide variety of
physical and chemical forms and may contain quantities of radio-
active materials ranging from trace amounts to thousands of
curies per cubic foot. In general, however, some low-level
wastes contain very low concentrations of radioactive
contamination and require little or no radiation shielding for
human handling. They also require relatively short isolation
from man's environment (tens to hundreds of years of isolation,
in contrast to the thousands needed for high-level wastes).
Historically, these types of wastes have been disposed of in
shallow -land burial sites operated commercially or by the
Department of Energy. Yet the disposal capacity for radioactive
wastes has been decreasing as the volume of wasteshas increased.
In 1970, six commercial low-level shallow land disposals sites
were operating; in 1983, four of those sites had closed because
of problems, and the remaining two had curtailed disposals. Yet
at the same time, the annual volume of wastes has increased from
25,000 cubic meters to 95,000 cubic meters.
Several key questions will be addressed as part of these
negotiations including:
e What is the appropriate level of environmental and
public health protection associated with the disposal
of these wastes?
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* What is the appropriate form and a numerical value for
low-level waste standards?
e Are there some types or classes of radioactive waste
that do not need regulatory control?
* What are the key factors in reasonably assuming that
environmental protection standards will be satisfied?
* Is a 100 year institutional control period for LLW
disposal facilties an appropriate time?
e What should be the basis for determining to which
facilities the standard should be applied?
* What method should be employed to confirm that
environmental standards are being met?
These questions are illustrative only.- There may be
additions or deletions depending on the interests of parties.
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ATTACHMENT B
DRAFT
PROPOSED PROCEDURAL GROUNDRULES
FOR EPA NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING PROJECT
1. The negotiation will be conducted in the context of the Federal
Advisary Committee Act (FACA) in accordance with a specific charter
which allows for a maximum of 20 members on the committee. Under
FACA, meetings will be announced in the Federal Register and open
to the public unless closed under allowable FACA provisions.
2. ERM-McGlennon Associates will serve as the neutral
convenor/facilitator helping to organize the negotiations and
working with all parties to ensure that the process runs smoothly.
3. Participants must be prepared to negotiate in good faith. As such,
a senior representative from each organization who can speak for
that organization must be designated to serve on the negotiating
group.
4. If a consensus is reached that fulfills the relevant statutory
requirements, EPA is committed to using the consensus as the basis
of a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
5. The negotiating group itself will establish detailed procedures
with respect to meeting times and places, the use of the Resource
Pool and other items which they deem appropriate including:
-protecting confidential business information,
-establishing deadlines for completion of negotiations,
-"opting out" either during the negotiations or after
their completion, and
-speaking freely and openly during negotiations without
being adversely affected in later proceedings.
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ATTACHMENT C
INITIAL LIST OF POTENTIAL PARTIES
LOW-LEVEL WASTE DISPOSAL
RADIATION PROTECTION STANDARD
- Atomic Industrial Forum
- Environmental Policy Institute
- Conference of State Radiation Control Directors
- Health Physics Society
- League of Women Voters
- National Governors Association
- Sierra Club
- Utility Nuclear Waste Management Group
- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
- U.S. Department of Energy
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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ATTACHMENT A
CONFLICT ASSESSMENT FORM
INTERVIEWER:
_FILIATION:
DATE:
1. FAMILIARITY
A. with process
B. with LLW issues
C. with status of proposed rule
2. MAJOR CONCERNS
A. of organization
B. you personally
C. how can these concerns be addressed?
3. OTHER PARTIES
A. who are they?
B. what are there concerns?
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C. what do you think EPA's position is on this rule?
D. do you have a problem with any
participation?
E. are you in contact with any of
of the parties? their
the parties?
4. EXPECTATIONS
A. What is your desired outcome?
B. What do you think is the likely outcome?
C. Are there alternatives that might be acceptable?
D. What are the likely barriers to an agreement?
E. Can they
F. Is there
(barriers) be accomodated? how?
room for compromise?
5. PARTICIPATION-
A. Is your group willing to participate? Are there
remaining questions we can help address?
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B. Who should represent your group?
C. What process do you need to follow for your
representative to be empowered?
D. Will your representative be able to speak for your
group?
E. Will your representative be willing to speak for any
other group?
F. Do you have a process for checking back with your
organization?
6. PROTOCOLS (refer to examples)
A. Are there any other protocols that you wish to
recommend to the group?
B. Discuss the resource pool.
C. Discuss the negotiation process. Do you have any other
recommendations?
D. Discuss the role of the documentation team - follow-up
phone calls.
E. Any other questions
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Environmental Policy Institute
317 Pennsylvania Ave. S.E. Washington. D.C 20003
202! 544-2600
November 2, 1983
Mr. Jack Campbell
Acting Assistant Administrator for
Policy and Resource Management
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
401 M Street S.W.
Room 1013 West Tower
Washington, D.C. 20460
Dear Mr. Campbell;
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Agency's imple-
mentation of the "Regulatory Negotiation Project" and the pro-
posed selection of low-level radioactive waste(LLW) regulations
as the initial demonstration of the negotiation concept. I found
our meeting on Friday, October 28th to be very helpful in gaining
an understanding of the Agency's goals in this endeavor. I
sincerely appreciate your willingness to meet with us and your
generous commitment of time.
It is my intention here to summarize the principal reasons as
to why the Agency's anticipated rulemaking on low-level radioac-
tive waste is not an appropriate choice for regulatory
negotiation. As we discussed, my concerns extend beyond the
issue or whether or not the low-level radioactive waste rule is
an appropriate candidate for regulatory negotiation and into the
conduct of the negotiation program.
Despite previously proposed selection criteria(48 FR 7494;
February 22, 1983), EPA proposes to select a rule that does not
fit those criteria and, more importantly, the selection mechanism
did not identify unique aspects of the low-level waste rule which
make it inappropriate for selection.
I note in passing that the EPA criteria are less extensive
and less rigorous than those outlined by proponents of the nego-
tiation process(Harter, Philip J., "Negotiating Regulations: A
Cure for Malaise", 71 Geo.L.J.l(1982)) (Administrative Conference
of the U.S., "Recommendation No.82-4", 47 FR 30708-30710, July
15, 1982). For example, the Administrative Conference,
recognizing the need to keep the absolute number of participants
in the negotiation to a workable minimum, recommended keeping the
number of "interests that will be significantly effected by the
rule and therefore represented at the negotiations" restricted to
the point that the number of'participants representing those
interests be no more than fifteen. EPA criteria, however,
anticipate that the number of "parties interested in or affected
by the outcome of the- development process" number between 10 and
15. Participants are not synonymous with 'affected interests.
Furthermore, the low-level waste rule could involve dozens of
"effected interests".
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The unique circumstances surrounding the LLW include the
fact that there is no statutory framework for the rule. EPA's
authority for the LLW rule stems entirely from the 1970
Reorganization Plan creating the Agency. As such, the Agency's
radiation authority has been interpreted to allow it to set only
general environmental standards. EPA, under this interpretation,
does not have authority to set technology control requirements,
nor to permit facilities, nor to enforce the standards. In
short, the field of negotiation settles on a series of very
narrow technical debates concerning dose pathways and health
risks. The potential to develop policy tradeoffs, the theoreti-
cal heart of a negotiation process, appears to be virtually non-
existent while the ground for technical and scientific debate
appears almost endless.
Not only has radiation exposure and risk assessment been the
subject of three decades of intense debate and showing no signs
of lessening given new analyses of the Japanese atomic bomb data,
but the regulations would conceivably cover dozens of types of
facilities and hundreds of waste products. The Agency's August
31st ANPRM announcing the low-level waste rule, and made without
reference to its consideration as a candidate for negotiation,
identified four general institutional categories alone to which
the rule would apply; nuclear power-related facilities, medical
and research institutions, industrial facilities, and Government
operations. Within these categories, the rule would cover many
different industrial processes and types of facilities to say
nothing or the many related waste products. The proposed
undertaking fails to take into account the need to field
negotiating teams, and the development of data bases, to address
such issues of this nature in a "negotiation" format including
the the enormous resource commitment it would entail from
effected parties.
As noted above, EPA's authority to promulgate the LLW rule
does not originate from any legislative action or directive, but
rests on the 1970 Reorganization Plan. As such, there is no
consensus or impetus for developing the proposed rule and in fact
the attention of environmental groups, the public, and state
officials has been directed in an entirely different arena; the
political debate over the establishment of regional low-level
waste compacts for the low-level waste management pursuant to the
Low Level Waste Policy Act ot 1980.
The absence or prior legislative debate, which would
inevitably preceed Agency rulemakings in other environmental
protection areas, results in a lack of easily identifiable issues
and controversies. Even more significantly, key interests, such
as environmental organizations, do not have a policy
making/communication network in this area upon which to base and
conduct their negotiation. The establishment of such a mechanism
is customarily associated with legislative campaigns and post-
legislative implementation, but is lacking for LLW.
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The difficulty of establishing and maintaining internal con-
sensus/communication mechanisms within large interest groups
engaged in negotiation has been all but ignored by the EPA. This'
is a specific problem in the proposed low-level waste rule for
the reasons identified here, but would confront any negotiation.
In general, non-industry or non-agency parties will be faced with
a difficult task of assembling a means of representation within
their constituencies. This applies no less to parties like the
National Conference of State Legislatures, which is not equipped
or structured to represent its members in a day-to-day
negotiation than to the environmental community. I do not
believe that representatives of the environmental community could
genuinely represent those interests in a negotiated rulemaking on
low-level radioactive waste, or any other generic rulemaking, in
the absence of a communication/consensus mechanism and the
resources necessary to maintain it.
The problem of representation in regulatory negotiations is
compounded, in my view, by the absence of identifiable procedures
or criteria to select parties to the negotiation and to assure
that parties have equal resources. Not only will other Federal
agencies(DOE and NRC) with almost limitless resources be involved
in the low-level waste negotiations, but other parties including
industrial trade organizations possess.resources well beyond
those which can be developed by public interest or state repre-
sentatives. In fact, some of the state organizations(NGA, NCSL,
Conference of State Radiation Program Directors), and at least
one public interest organization(LWV), depend upon funding from
DOE for LLW activities. It goes without saying that we do not
view DOE nor NRC as neutral parties in this proceeding. DOE
currently spends about $8 -million in direct line item authority
annually promoting low-level waste technologies and the
establishment of new disposal sites. Of this amount,
approximately $2.5 million is distributed to state governments,
agencies and state associations. EPA's proposal to provide
$50,000 for technical support and research for all parties falls
far short of what would be required to achieve parity among the
interests involved.
I repeat here, for the record, my concern that under the
Agency's proposed procedures the groundrules for individual
negotiations would not be determined until the negotiation is .in
session. It is my firm belief that parties should know, and
agree to, the procedures for the negotiation and their rights of
participation prior to commencement.
In sum, I am not advocating that EPA abandon its efforts to
regulate low-level radioactive waste as others propose. I am
also not endorsing the current system of regulation development
especially at the ANPR level. I do have serious reservations,
however, about the use of regulatory negotiation, as proposed by
the Agency, in the low-level waste rulemaking. Those
reservations have been reinforced by the apparent lack of
rigorous procedures for selecting candidate rules and conducting
the negotiations. Similarly, I am concerned about a central
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point ot disagreement raised in our meeting; your view that the
regulatory negotiation process was an appropriate means to
resolve scientific controversies.
Regulatory negotiation, as described by its advo-cates, is not
a mechanism for resolving disputes of fact nor conducting scien-
tific debate for the benefit of the Agency. Rather it is intended
to serve as means of resolving regulatory conflicts among effec-
ted parties through negotiated trade-offs ot regulatory policies
mutually effecting those parties. While I am reluctant to
oversimplify our disagreement; I believe there is a fundamental
difference between "debate" over scientific or technical evidence
or theory and "negotiation" among effected parties over how an
environmental pollutant should be regulated.
As I stated several times in our meeting, I firmly believe
that the Agency should review the characteristics of the many
different types or regulatory issues, including scientific
issues, before it and examine a range of preliminary "consensus"
or "resolution" mechanisms which may be appropriate to them. I
think the Agency's interest in examining complex scientific
issues preliminary to rulemaking merely underscores the need for
an appropriate means to do so. It does not argue for "regulatory
negotiation", as the one concept under examination, to be selec-
ted as a suitable approach. Other mechanisms, such as formal or
informal public hearings, could be used to achieve the desired
end.
Sincerely,
David Beric
Environmental Policy Institute
cc: B. Early(SC)
B. Finamore(NRDC)
R. Percival(EDF)
M. Taden (UCS)
D. Doniger (NRDC)
W. Butler(AS)
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REGULATORY NEGOTIATION PROJECT
INFORMATION KIT
"Executive Summary"
Overview
EPA's
Current
System
What is
Negotiation?
Genesis
of EPA's
Project
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has
begun a project to study the usefulness of all-party,
face-to-face negotiations as a supplement to the current
adversarial system of regulatory development. The project
will apply the negotiation process to two rulemakings.
EPA's current process of developing regulations
is directly linked to the "informal notice and comment"
requirements specified in the Administrative-Procedure
Act. As such, it is largely an adversarial process: The
agency develops facts and policy, and solicits information
from interested and affected parties. The agency then
analyzes all the information and issues a rule. When
this system fails to accommodate competing interests,
the result is litigation or some other form of conflict.
Negotiation, on the other hand, is an accommodation
process which gives the parties far greater control of
the decisionmaking. Parties with different intersts can
resolve issues by meeting, discussing, and agreeing upon
facts, questions, and solutions. An advantage to negotia-
tion in the regulatory area is that the parties determined
not only the substance of the rule but also the proce-
dures for deciding what the substance of the rule wiTl
be. Encouraging the parties to share information and to
work together allows for creative approaches to resolving
issues and reaching consensus.
Regulatory negotiation is not a new concept. Build-
ing codes, electrical and plumbing standards, and product
safety measures are all developed through a process of
negotiation among affected parties. In addition, regula-
tory negotiation takes place in settling lawsuits that
challenge regulations promulgated by an agency. Further-
more, in the environmental area, negotiation and mediation
processes have been used frequently to manage regulatory
conflicts involving government agencies.
In 1982, the Administrative Conference of the United
States (ACUS) recommended (82-4) that agencies consider
assembling parties in interest to a given rulemaking and
negotiate the text of the proposed rule. To date, three
agencies--FAA, OSHA, and EPA--have initiated negotiations
related to developing rules.
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A Descrip- EPA's -regulatory negotiation project will involve
tion of two rulemakings. The goal of the negotiation will be
EPA's to reach consensus on which to base the Notice of Pro-
Project posed Rulemaking (NPRM). The Administrator will use
any consensus--so long as it is within his statutory
authority--as the basis of the proposed rulemaking.
The project will investigate:
o the value of developing regulations by
negotiation
o the types of regulations which are most
appropriate for this process
-o the -procedures and circumstances which best
- foster negotiations
The negotiations will occur at the pre-proposal stage
All the normal Administrative Procedure Act requirements
will continue to apply.
If the pilot negotiated rulemaking process is success
ful, and well received by the agency and the public, EPA
will consider adding it to its repertoire of methods for
developing regulations.
The Regulation Management Staff (RMS) designed the
project and will administer it for EPA. A staff member
from the lead program office at EPA will negotiate as
the party-in-interest for EPA. Parties representing
legitimate and definable interest groups will negotiate
on behalf of their constituencies.
A neutral third party will chair the negotiations,
keep the process moving smoothly, and assist in resolving
disputes. For the first negotiation, EPA will use an
outside contractor in this role of convenor-facilitator;
for the second negotiation, staff from EPA's Office of
Standards and Regulations will perform this function.
The Harvard Negotiation Project will document the
entire project. After the negotiations, EPA will issue
a final report describing the experience, what it has
learned, and any intended follow-up.
Steos in The major steps in EPA's demonstration project are:
the Project
o Establishing criteria and selecting appro-
priate items for negotiation.
o Preparing a Federal Advisory Committee Act
(FACA) charter
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(3
Status of
the Project
o Designing and establishing a resource pool to
support the group in reaching consensus
- o Commencing and completing negotiations
o Documenting the project
and
o Issuing a final report
On February 22, 1983, EPA published a notice in the
Federal Register, requesting parties to submit suggestions
for. rules to be negotiated. EPA also solicited suggestior
internally from Program Offices and had its contractors
send requests for suggestions to 66 environmental groups,
trade associations, and other organizations. In all, over
50 candidate regulations were nominated.
EPA is now in the process of screening the candidate
regulations. Once the agency has selected the first can-
didate for negotiated rulemaking, it will publish a notice
in the Federal Register announcing its intent to establish
a FACA Advisory Committee, and listing the candidate item,
potential issues, parties, etc. The notice-will propose
the procedures and guidelines to be used, and will invite
public comment.
After evaluating the responses to the notice, EPA
will issue (if appropriate) a final notice, announcing
the establishment of the Committee, and setting a date
for the first meeting.
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